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## ІНСТИТУТИ РОЗВИТКУ В СОЦІАЛЬНО-ЕКОНОМІЧНІЙ СИСТЕМІ СУЧАСНОЇ УКРАЇНИ

**Актуальність.** Актуальність дослідження обумовлена тим, що за роки трансформації економіки України було створено ринкові інститути, проте інститути розвитку створено не було.

**Мета та завдання.** Метою статті є визначення основних інститутів, які сприяють розвитку, та вивчити специфіку їх функціонування в сучасній Україні.

**Результати.** В інституційній системі розвинених країн найважливішим соціальним інститутом, який ініціює прогрес економіки, є профспілка. Профспілки прагнуть до підвищення заробітної плати, що заохочує роботодавців впроваджувати на своїх підприємствах винаходи, які витісняють працю, підвищувати технічний рівень своїх компаній. Створення таких профспілок у сучасній Україні ускладнено, оскільки цю інституційну нішу вже займають профспілки, успадковані від радянської системи, де вони не вирішували проблем вартості робочої сили та робочого часу, їх діяльність обмежувалася масовою культурною роботою. Це те, що вони продовжують робити і в сучасній Україні.

Такий висновок зроблено на основі дослідження стану колективних трудових спорів, заборгованості по заробітній платі та руху реальної заробітної плати за період 2013-2018 років. Зіставлення цих показників свідчить, що при помітному падінні реальної заробітної плати та зростанні заборгованості, протестна активність на ринку праці не зростала. Українські трудові колективи дуже рідко використовують таку форму вирішення трудових конфліктів як страйк. Не зважаючи на погіршення матеріального стану працівників у цей період, навіть кількість невідпрацьованих годин у середньому на одного працівника, який брав участь у страйку, незначна. А у 2017 році, коли статистика зафіксувала максимальну кількість підприємств та організацій, на яких відбулися страйки, тобто 23, кількість невідпрацьованих годин у середньому на одного працівника, який брав участь у страйку, склала усього 66. Звертає на себе увагу, що у 2015 році, екстремальному з точки зору погіршення матеріального становища осіб найманої праці, кількість невіршених трудових спорів знизилася до мінімального за весь досліджений період значення 34,8%. Показово також і те, що у результаті страйку було вирішено лише один колективний трудовий спір у 2013 році і один у 2015.

Економічний розвиток в значному ступені залежить не лише від економічних інститутів, але і від політичних. Серед них найважливішими є політичні партії. Політичні партії в Україні не сформувалися ще як ідеологічні організації. Це зробило політичні партії таким соціальним інститутом, який слабо впливає на економічний розвиток.

Таким чином. Специфікою сучасної соціально-економічної системи України є те, що основні соціальні інститути розвитку, а саме, профспілки та політичні партії, слабо впливають на економічний розвиток.

**Висновки.** Зміни в інституційній системі можливі лише за наявності соціальних сил, зацікавлених у таких змінах та здатних їх здійснити

**Ключові слова:** технічний прогрес, мотивація, профспілка, політична партія.

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## INSTITUTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF MODERN UKRAINE

**Topicality.** The actuality of problem is due to the fact that over the years of the Ukrainian economy transformation, market institutions have been created, and development institutions have not.

**Aim and tasks.** The aim of the study is to identify the basic institutions that promote development, and to study the specificity of their functioning in modern Ukraine.

**Research results.** Research shows that in the institutional system of developed countries, the main social institution that initiates progress of the economy is trade union. Trade unions are seeking for a wage increase that encourages employers to introduce in their enterprises inventions that supplant labour, to raise the technical level of their companies. The creation of such trade unions in modern Ukraine is difficult, because this institutional niche is already occupied by trade unions inherited from the Soviet system, where they did not solve the problems of labour cost and working time, their activities were limited to mass cultural work. This is what they continue to do in modern Ukraine. This conclusion is based on a study of the status of collective labour disputes, wage arrears and real wage movements for the period 2013-2018. Comparison of these indicators shows that with a marked fall in real wages and rising debt, protest activity in the labour market did not increase. Ukrainian labour collectives very rarely use such form of resolution of labour conflicts as a strike. Despite the deterioration of the financial status of workers during this period, even the number of hours not worked on average per worker involved in the strike is insignificant. And in 2017, when statistics recorded the maximum number of businesses and organizations that went on strike, that is, 23, the average number of hours not worked per strike worker was only 66. Note that in 2015, extreme in terms of deterioration of the financial status of persons employed, the number of unresolved labour disputes decreased to a minimum value of 34.8% for the whole studied period. It is also significant that only one collective labour dispute was resolved in 2013 and one in 2015 as a result of the strike. Such paradoxical evidence that the deterioration of the financial position of workers, the growth of unresolved labor conflicts and demands of workers does not lead to an intensification of the struggle of trade unions and the radicalization of their actions, indicate that trade unions behave is radically different from the way known in developed countries.

Economic development largely depends not only on economic institutions but also on political ones. Political parties are the most important among them. Political parties in Ukraine have not yet formed as ideological organizations. This has made political parties such a social institution that has little influence on economic development. Thus, in the modern institutional system of Ukraine, the main social institutions, that are trade unions and political parties, have little influence on economic development.

**Conclusion.** Changes in the institutional system are possible only if there are social forces interested in such changes and able to implement them.

**Keywords:** technical progress, motivation, trade union, political party.

**Problem statement and its connection with important scientific and practical tasks.** In the development of economics, two stages are constantly combined: the creation of radical innovations, and then their widespread. The first stage can be considered revolutionary in the development of productive forces. The second one is evolutionary.

The gap between the creation of new technologies and their extended use reveals the space for the use of innovations, even in those countries that did not initiate their invention. However, the use of new technologies in less developed countries does not automatically lead to the emergence of an innovative type of development there. This is due to the fact that the import of technologies does not mean the simultaneous import of institutions. Institutions arise in each country based on its specific historical conditions. Despite the need for economic development of backward countries, the relevant institutions have not been there for quite long time. All this makes research into the specifics of the institutions of the countries that are lagging behind in their development, an actual problem not only for economic theory, but also for economic policy.

**Analysis of recent publications on the problem.** Since the mid-twentieth century, a growing flow of publications are devoted to the economic problems of countries that are lagging behind in their development. In numerous works by S. Amin, A. G. Franck, H. Zinger, R. Prebisch, F. Cardozo, S. Furtado, T. du Santos, R. Allen, E. de Soto and other authors problems of backwardness and underdevelopment are thoroughly investigated. These studies show that the backwardness in the growth of welfare is a consequence of the backwardness in the formation of economic relations of a market type, institutions of a market economy, and even more - in the establishment of civil society institutions

In a study by N. Rosenberg and L.E. Birdzell [1] is argued the thesis that the path to economic prosperity of the developed countries is laid by a constant change in the organization of their economic life on the basis of experimentation and pragmatic approach. Western countries have become richer than other countries because they were able to provide separation of the economy from the state (politics) and provide decentralization of economic power. Unlike developed countries, in most of the developing countries, political and economic power is united, consolidated, and there are no social forces that can break this integration. Economic growth, which is now characteristic of developed countries, is based on the implementation of innovations, while the economic growth that is characteristic of backward countries is based on the increasing involvement of additional capital, labor force and minerals in the economic turnover.

Lacking in their development, the countries have significant opportunities for such an extensive type of growth, but they do not have the institutional conditions necessary for innovation, for the intensive type of growth and development that is typical of Western countries.

While focusing on institutional development conditions, these authors do not, however, indicate which institutions lack the backward countries.

E. Reinert [2] agrees that economic growth in the less developed countries is extensive and reduced to additional resources in production. As a result, the economic backwardness of these countries is preserved. He believes that this condition is the result of specialization, based on the theory of comparative advantages of D. Ricardo. Similarly, R. C. Allen [3] explains the backwardness by the theory of comparative advantages.

Following Istvan Hont [4], E. Reinert argues that the choice of specialization for backward countries should be discarded from the theory of comparative advantages and use the principle of emulation. Emulation is a simulation of foreign innovations in order to equalize or even surpass them. He explains his concept in this example. If the tribe living through the river has made a step in development from the Stone Age to the bronze, then your own tribe faces a choice: to maintain its comparative advantage in the Stone Age or to try to emulate the neighboring tribe and grow followed by him to the level of the Bronze Age. According to E. Reinert, all of today's rich countries necessarily passed through the period when emulation was their main strategy. It is because of the fact that instead of emulation is used the theory of comparative economic benefits of D. Ricardo, the level of real wages falls in many countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and in the last quarter century - in countries of Eastern Europe.

Again, like previous authors, E. Reinert does not explain how the institutions of developed countries have ensured the passage of the emulation period and the transition to a state of advanced development.

D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson [5] argue that the prosperity or decline of states is due, first of all, to the nature of their economic and political institutions. To determine the correspondence of institutes with the developmental tasks, they use the concepts of "extractive" and "inclusive" social institutions. Extractive economic institutions allow elites, that is, groups that control political power in the country, manage the state's economy for their own benefit. They limit the ability of other groups of citizens to benefit from participation in economic processes. Extractive institutions allow the alienation of incomes and even property in favor of narrow groups. Examples are states where the elites support their power with the help of the army, the police, dependent courts and other structures that the authors refer to extractive political institutions.

Inclusive economic institutions provide opportunities for the participation of a large number of citizens in economic processes in order to profit. Exclusion of income and property is not allowed. Inclusive economic institutions are supported by inclusive political institutions, which prevent narrow groups of citizens from regulating the state's economy in their favor. Such institutions are the foundation of liberal democracies.

Thus, D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson note the interconnectedness and interaction of economic and political institutions. At the same time, the authors, like E. Reinert, note that economic growth is possible in both extractive and inclusive institutions. However, the growth dynamics is different. Countries with inclusive institutions are capable of sustainable growth and development, which benefits the majority of the population, which determines the welfare of the entire society. In countries with extractive institutions, economic growth is short-lived and does not lead to a significant increase in the welfare of the majority of the population; in addition, it is not related to development.

While linking development with inclusive institutions, the authors do not, however, determine how to move from the dominance of extractive institutions to the dominance of inclusive institutions. This is the most relevant transition for backward countries.

The question raised about the social institutions is particularly relevant for the characterization of the socio-economic system, economic and political situation in Ukraine in the course of its market reform.

**Allocation of previously unsolved parts of the general problem.** Authors studying the institutional system of post-Soviet countries are based on the methodological principles of the institutional theory, that is work out in developed countries: B. M. Andrushkov, R. M. Nureev, V. V. Dementiev. Due to this, from the attention of the researchers slip away some specific institutions that formally are relevant to the institutions of developed countries, but actually they are significantly different from them.

The need for research of such specific institutes is due to the desire of the domestic community to integrate into the European community, which is characterized by developed institutes.

**Formulation of research objectives (problem statement).** The purpose of this article is to identify the basic institutions that promote development, and to study the specificity of their functioning in modern Ukraine.

**An outline of the main results and their justification.** Institutionalism combines the riches of peoples with a set of rules that determine the conditions for the functioning and development of social production. Basic institutions, as a rule, include institutional stability, low taxes, price stability, inviolability of property, personal integrity, social mobility, competitive markets, intellectual property rights [6, p. 210-237]. Such fundamental institutions have been created in post-Soviet countries. Among these institutions, the most important role is played by those that provide economic development. Most researchers consider such institutions to be property rights. However, according to E. de Soto [7, p. 155-208], property laws, which are formed almost in all countries of the world, do not work outside the West. This state of affairs is due to the fact that the protection of property rights requires a whole set of public institutions that go beyond the boundaries of the economy. These are legal and political institutions. Thus, the creation of institutes of economic development is a complex process, the implementation of which is inseparable from the political and legal process [8].

According to leading researchers, which are confirmed by the historical experience of Ukraine, it is the policy and political institutions that determine the choice of economic institutions: Zadorozhny G.V., Melnyk L. and Koretsky M.H., Dementiev V.V., Acemoglu D. and Robinson J.A. It depends on political institutions, whether citizens can influence decision-making by politicians. In other words, will politicians act in the interests of citizens, or they will be able to use the power entrusted to them by the society for their own enrichment and conduct of politics that is beneficial to them only, but is totally disadvantageous to voters. With such an interpretation of the interrelations between politics and the economy, the problem of controlling voters (citizens) over politicians and civil servants (the authorities) becomes a central problem in the formation of development institutes. The most important thing is the formation of such civil society institutions that can provide economic policy-making that reflects the economic interests of society as a whole, and not just the interests of the politicians themselves.

It goes without saying that not all civil society institutions have the same potential for pressure on the authorities. The most powerful force is the mass and well-organized institutions that are able not only to express their own interests, but also to cause economic damage to the authorities in the event of ignoring these interests. Such an institution in developed countries today is trade unions. The pressure of trade unions on employers forces them to raise wages, which makes labor an expensive resource and motivates employers to look for opportunities to replace this expensive resource with cheaper ones. Technology comes to the rescue. Technical progress, and then - scientific and technological progress, develops only under the constant pressure of trade unions on employers with demands for wage increases. So things unfold in the developed countries. In post-Soviet countries, including in Ukraine, trade unions do not exert pressure on employers to raise wages, and as a result, they do not play the role of a motivator of changes in the technical level of production.

For example, the fall in real wages in 2014 by 6.5%, then more than 20% in 2015 and the subsequent increase in wage arrears by 323.6% in 2015 and 142.5% in addition in 2016 year (Table 1) did not cause an increase in protest activity of trade unions of Ukraine.

Table 1

**Rate of change in real wages and arrears of wages,% to the previous year\***

2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
The rate of change in real wages,% to the previous year									
90,8	110,2	108,7	114,4	108,2	93,5	79,8	109,0	119,1	112,5
Wage arrears by type of economic activity (in% as of January 1 of the reporting year to January 1 of the previous year)									
177,8	123,9	82,7	80,2	91,4	90,4	323,6	142,5	95,2	132,2

\*Data without temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol [9]

According to Table 2, despite the decline in living standards, only 2 enterprises in 2013 and 5 in 2014 and 2015 had strikes (Table 2).

Table 2

**The dynamics of strikes and their consequences**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Number of enterprises and organizations at which the strikes took place	2	5	5	-	23	-
The number of workers involved in the strikes, thousand	0,1	1,6	0,9	-	2,1	-
The number of hours not worked on average per worker involved in the strike	11	194	133	-	66	-

[9].

The number of strikers is remarkable. So, in 2013, they were attended by one hundred people, in 2014 - one thousand six hundred people, in 2015 - when the fall in living standards worsened both in terms of falling wages and in terms of non-payment, in the strikes participated only 900 people. The losses due to strikes were also not significant. Thus, in 2013, one worker who participated in the strike did not work on average for only 11 hours, in 2014 - already 194. However, this number declined to 133 in the extreme 2015 and then to 66 in 2017. It is clear that such scale protests do not force employers to change their pay patterns. As shown in Table 3, the scale of unresolved labor problems continued to grow.

Table 3

**Collective labor disputes (units)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
	Production / branch	Production / branch	Production / branch	Production / branch	Production / branch	Production / branch
Number of collective labor disputes, total	205/4	167/4	181/7	180/7	210/6	306/6
Resolved collective labor disputes	110/1	91/-	118/3	105/1	72/-	135/-
of them:						
with the assistance of NMRS	73/-	59/-	57/1	81/1	46/-	79/-
as a result of the strike	1/-	-/-	1/-	-/-		
Not resolved collective labor disputes at the end of the year	95/3	86/4	63/4	75/6	138/6	171/6
% of not resolved collective disputes at the end of the year	46,3%	51,5%	34,8%	41,7	65,7	55,9

[9].

The number of collective labor disputes from 2013 to 2018 increased from 205 units at the production level and 4 units at the branch level, to 306 and 6 at the corresponding levels, ie by 150%. At the same time, the number of resolved collective labor disputes at the production level during this period increased from 110 units to 135, ie by 122.7%, while the number of unresolved cases increased from 95 units to 171, ie by 180%. It is noteworthy that in 2015, extreme in terms of the deterioration of the financial situation of persons employed, the number of unresolved labor disputes decreased to a minimum of 34.8% over the whole studied period. It is also significant that only one collective labor dispute was resolved in 2013 and one in 2015 as a result of the strike. Other labor disputes have been resolved with the assistance of the National Mediation and Reconciliation Service (NMRS) or through negotiations with trade unions.

Table 4

**Resolving Employee Requirements in Collective Labor Disputes (Units)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
	Production / branch	Production / branch	Production / branch	Production / branch	Production / branch	Production / branch
Requirements of employees, total	443/15	421/9	462/18	362/37	467/35	627/33
resolved at the beginning of the year	230/8	194/-	306/8	186/2	202/2	249/-
not resolved at the end of the reporting period	213/7	227/9	156/10	176/35	265/33	378/33
% of not resolved employee requirements at the end of the reporting period	48,1%	53,9%	33,8%	46,6%	56,8%	60,3%

[9].

In addition to labor disputes, there are requirements of employees which do not reach the level of labor conflicts but need to be considered and resolved. Thus, for the period 2013-2018, the demands of employees increased from 443 at the industrial level and 15 at the sectoral level to 627 and 33 respectively. Of these, 48.1% to 60.3% remained unresolved during this period. Again, the minimum share of not resolved employee requirements was in 2015 - only 33.8%. Such paradoxical evidence that the deterioration of the financial position of workers, the growth of unresolved labor conflicts and demands of workers does not lead to an intensification of the struggle of trade unions and the radicalization of their actions, indicate that trade unions behave is radically different from the way known in developed countries.

This state of affairs is due to the fact that modern Ukrainian trade unions are successors of Soviet trade unions, which did not solve the problems of cost of labor and the length of working time. Their competences were limited to cultural-mass work and material assistance to individual members of the teams in pre-arranged cases. It is these functions that are limited to the activities and modern domestic trade unions, which significantly, in principle, distinguishes them from trade unions of Western countries. Domestic trade unions are another institution that does not coincide with its social functions with trade unions of developed countries. However, it retains the same name and, moreover, it remains the most mass social institution in modern Ukraine. As a result of the lack of pressure on employers to raise wages, domestic entrepreneurs are not motivated to increase the technical level of production, to introduce scientific and technological progress in production. Accordingly, before the authorities do not face the problem of resolving disputes between hired labor and employers, there is no problem of stimulating technical progress, creating new jobs in high-tech sectors of production, developing science and scientific services, creating industrial parks and technopolises.

In today's conditions of deployment of a new industrial revolution, very slow technological progress is possible only in those sectors and types of production that operate on the domestic market and do not face the world's rival firms. Another is the situation of the cases of those manufacturers who are compelled to compete with world manufacturers. It is clear that the low salary of employees is their competitive advantage, but the low technical level of production makes their products uncompetitive. It is for these reasons that since the beginning of market transformations domestic producers of technically complex diversified products have been ruined, which competed with foreign firms not only by the parameter of the price of the goods, but also by the quality parameter. At the same time, producers of standardized products, which competed with foreign firms only by the parameter of the price of the goods, proved to be competitive. They began to increase volumes of production and volumes of supplies to foreign markets.

The volumes of agricultural production and extractive industries expanded but the production of technically sophisticated products fell. As a result, the primitivization of the sectoral structure of the economy took place.

This way of changing the sectoral structure of the economy is not fundamentally new in the world. Before the post-Soviet countries, this was the same in colonies, i. e., the sectoral structure of the colonies' economies was primitivized, and as a result of this they became dependent not only politically but also economically [3, p. 81-84].

The market mechanism of economic deindustrialization on the basis of specialization on the principle of comparative advantage is universal; it operates in the modern economy as destructively as in the past in the colonies. This is how the deindustrialization of the Ukrainian economy took place, which lost the field of machine building and increased the scale of production in agriculture, where it has comparative economic advantages. At the same time, the domestic economy does not produce the means of labor necessary for agriculture, that is, simultaneously with the expansion of production of agrarian products, the demand for agricultural machinery, which domestic farmers buy in the world market, paying for agricultural products increases. A closed circle of dependence is created: to increase the production of agrarian products, it is necessary to increase the park of agricultural machinery, and for this purpose it is necessary to further expand production in agriculture [10].

Under such conditions, it would be economically rational to create own engineering branches for agriculture, construction, and everyday life, that is, to pursue a policy of industrialization. Such an economic policy can only be accepted by those social forces that benefit from its implementation. To this end, the relevant social forces should be represented in the law-making body of the state, where they will be able to carry out a number of necessary laws. Thus, the change of specialization, based on the principle of comparative advantages, which promotes industrial and innovative development, requires political decisions. The adoption of such decisions may lead to the loss of part of the profits of those circles that benefit from the specialization that has already been formed, based on the principle of comparative advantage. It is clear that they will resist such changes. The ruling elites of dependent countries have no economic motives for implementing a development strategy. In these countries a special social stratum of the ruling class - the comprador bourgeoisie, which is interested in economic policies aimed at benefiting the ruling elites, and not the interests of the economic development of society as a whole, has formed. Such a structure of economic interests was formed in economically dependent countries during colonial times and does not change to the present. Such a structure of economic interests is peculiar to the post-Soviet Ukraine.

The situation is similar in many post-Soviet countries. From the point of view of politicians and civil servants, there is no need to introduce institutes that are more useful for economic growth, if existing institutes are much better served by the interests of the ruling elite itself. In order to work out an effective economic policy that reveals the space for economic development, it is necessary that the decisions of the legislative body be taken in accordance with the interests of the non-narrow group of political and economic elites but the general population. As the historical experience of developed countries shows, this is possible only in a situation where at least two political parties, which have fundamentally different programs of action in the economy and which are accountable to voters, compete for power.

Such a political system for less developed countries has not yet been created [11]. Today's political system of Ukraine is characterized by the absence of political parties as ideological organizations accountable to voters. Today, 352 political parties are registered in Ukraine, of which about 50 are active. It is practically impossible to identify the ideological and political differences between these parties: all programmatic goals are vague, and the economic program is limited only by individual measures of a one-time nature. Eventually, society can not bring to the legislative power social forces that can break the closed circle of economic backwardness.

**Conclusions and perspectives of further research.** Thus, in the aggregate of public institutions, the most important economic institutions are trade unions that can exert pressure on employers to increase wages. It is high wages that motivate entrepreneurs to introduce scientific and technological progress into production. Creation of such trade unions in modern Ukraine is complicated, because this institutional niche is already occupied by trade unions inherited from the Soviet system, where they did not solve problems of cost of labor and duration of working time, but were limited only to cultural-mass work. It is this they continue to engage in modern Ukraine.

In the aggregate of public institutions, political parties are the most important political institutions. However, it has not yet been possible to create political parties as ideological organizations. As a result, such existing parties are acting not only in the interests of society, but only of certain social groups and even persons

Thus, in the present institutional system of Ukraine the main social institutions of development, ie trade unions and political parties, have not yet been formed. Their formation is the result of the creative action of social forces interested in the existence of such institutions and able to create them.

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